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It would be foolish if we attempted to impute
or ascribe philosophical inadequacy to
Uexku È ll's interpretations, instead of recogniz-
ing the engagement with concrete investiga-
tions like this is one of the most fruitful things
that philosophy can learn from contemporary
biology. (Heidegger 1995: 263)
Uexku È ll, one of the main founders of etho-
logy, is a Spinozist when ®rst he de®nes the
melodic lines or contrapuntal relations that
correspondtoeachthing,andthenhedescribes
a symphony as an immanent higher unity
that takes on a breadth and fullness (`natural
composition'). (Deleuze 1988: 126)
What busy inquirers into verbal semantics Ð
linguists,logiciansÐ haveprobedandpro®ted
from Uexku È ll's masterful Bedeutungslehre?
(Sebeok 1976: x)
In order to appreciate the abiding relevance of Jakob von Uexku È ll's work
forsemiotics andphilosophyI will®rst brie¯y introduce his work andthen
move to its appropriation by John Deely. This involves the not unfamiliar
maneuver of creeping up behind a thinker and producing something new
and interesting which both retains essential elements of their thought and
places them within an entirely dierent framework. In this case it will be
the shift from Uexku È ll's understandably German and Kantian idealism/
constructivism (`All reality is subjective appearance', Uexku È ll 1926: xv) to a
semiotic `constructivism' which is objective, but not as a binary opposite of
subjective in the classical modern sense. Objective in the semiotic sense
(with its roots in Scotus/Poinsot) can include aspects of the physical
and psychical in a labile interface. This requires a certain mental agility
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postmodernism worth the name Ð at least that is Deely's challenge.
Whether we retain the term postmodern or opt for Latour's (1999: 21)
nonmodern
1 matters little. Whatever the term, it will indicate something
dierent from modernism and current accounts of postmodernism.
Furthermore, I will seek to elaborate the critical distinction between the
animal and human animal Umwelt or species-speci®c objective worlds as
it is presented in Deely's work. This distinction is timely because although
it has similarities with Heidegger's treatment of exactly the same question,
I will claim that Deely provides a more articulate and nuanced analysis
and those who are shocked by and criticize Heidegger's `abyss' between
man and animal (e.g., Krell 1992, or Derrida 1989, 1991) might ®nd
this approach of value Ð even if only to distinguish themselves from
it. The ultimate issue being to what extent it can be said that a non-
languaging animal
2 apprehends its Umwelt or milieu/environing world
as a world at all.
3 Deely's distinction between zoo È semiosis and anthropo-
semiosis intersects with Wittgenstein's approach to forms of life and
expressive capacities that could only exist in language Ð `We say a dog
is afraid his master will beat him; but not, he is afraid his master will
beat him tomorrow. Why not?' (Wittgenstein 1958: }650). What would
be the expressive behavioral manifestation of this fear about a future
event? To what extent is it intelligible to say that a tick has a pain, or an
opinion, or lives in a `world' at all? These distinctions might force
themselves between us and become interesting. The concept of objective
being (i.e., something existing only insofar as it exists within awareness)
will be seen as providing the relational network for the fabrication of
species-speci®c objective worlds or Umwelten.
If we now translate Umwelt as objective world, we are also in a fair position to
see the signi®cance of this notion for the understanding of semiosis as a unique
process in nature. An Umwelt, von Uexku È ll tells us, is the physical environment as
®ltered or transformed by the given organism according to what is important or
`signi®cant' to it. Elements of the physical environment are networked objectively,
i.e., so as to establish the sphere of experience as something superordinate to and
strictly transcending, all the while containing partially and resting upon aspects of
the physical environment in its `natural' or `mind-independent' being. Umwelten
are thus species-speci®c: No two types of organisms live in the same objective
worlds, even though they share the same physical environment. What the bat seeks
(nourishment) the moth avoids (providing nourishment for bats), and conversely.
(Deely 1986a: 269)
Uexku È ll is now much better known than in 1976 when Sebeok asked who
hadbene®tedfromhisBedeutungslehre(TheoryofMeaning).InfactDeely
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ticians of the century'. What did he do to attract the attention of
philosophers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze, and Guattari,
and particularly semioticians (e.g., Sebeok, Deely) and biosemioticians
and biologists (e.g., Kull, Homeyer, Maturana, Bateson)?
I will rely principally on Jakob von Uexku È ll's son, Thure von Uexku È ll,
for a preparatory account of his father's work in T. von Uexku È ll (1982,
1989). Once the essential notions have been presented we will begin a
shift to Deely's semiotic interpretation which liberates J. von Uexku È ll
from his own somewhat counterproductive reliance on Kantian ideal-
ism (i.e., objects conform to cognition, never can cognition conform to
objectsÐtheclosedbubbleoftherepresentationalsphere).T.vonUexku È ll
also appears to ultimately rely on an orthodox Kantian perspective
although he realizes that `The epistemological premise of Jakob von
Uexku È ll's theory is neither objectivistic nor subjectivist but Ð as one
would describe it today Ð ``systemic''' (T. von Uexku È ll 1989: 129) Ð or
as one might also say `a semiotic reality'.
Jakob von Uexku È ll was born in 1864 in Keblaste, Estonia. He originally
studied zoology and his later work was concerned with how living beings
perceive their environment. He originated a method of research that
he called Umwelt-Forschung (Umwelt studies) and in 1926 founded the
Institut fuÈr Umweltforschung at the University of Hamburg.
4 As Deleuze
notes (see introductory quotation), Uexku È ll is considered to be one of
the founders of ethology. His primary interest was in the role played by
sign processes in living organisms. His fundamental starting point was
that living organisms respond to signs rather than causal impulses. Organ-
isms are selective interpreters, perceiving and acting subjects, that do not
respond to external eects in a causal-mechanical way, but with a speci®c,
autonomous response. Uexku È ll gives the now philosophically notorious
example of the tick's activity to illustrate his Umwelt-theory.
5
The tick as an interpreter Ð The functional cycle
In his remarkable A Stroll Through the Worlds of Animals and Men,
Uexku È ll assumes that anyone who lives in the country will know what a
tickis,butgiventhatformanypeoplethisisnotthecase,letusaddthatthe
tick is a small insect (Ixodinae) related to mites, that lives o the warm
bloodofmammals.ParaphrasingUexku È ll'saccount(1957:6±13)thelifeof
the tick as interpreter unfolds in the following way:
The blind and deaf tick needs to eat so it climbs to the end of some twig
or branch where it may fall or be brushed o onto a passing mammal.
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an approaching mammal due to its sense of smell (i.e., the mammal has
a speci®c odor caused by its sweat glands). When the tick senses the odor
(or sign) of the passing mammal it drops (with luck) onto it and latches
on. The tick is sensitive to temperature and seeks out a warm hairless spot
(e.g., anarmpit)whereitwill pumpitself fullofblood,becomingthesize of
a garden pea.
For Uexku È ll the point of this scenario is that `what we are dealing with
is not with an exchange of forces between two objects, but the relations
between a living subject and its object' (Uexku È ll 1957: 11). There
are certainly physical and chemical stimuli, but to stop at this purely
physiological observation is to have missed something important!
A traditional physiological account would describe the tick's behavior
as a `re¯ex arc' elicited by physical and chemical stimuli (e.g., butyric acid,
temperature, tactile response). The re¯ex arc would simply transmit, by
way of the activity of the nervous system, purely physical eects of motion
between sensory receptors and the muscles of the eectors. The entire
process would involve a transfer of motion (like a mechanism) without any
interpretive or perceptual activity that could not be reduced to purely
physical terms. Uexku È ll will certainly recognize the physical or chemical
stimuli but argue that this approach misses the point:
We are not concerned with the chemical stimulus of butyric acid, any more than
with the mechanical stimulus (released bythe hairs), or the temperature stimulus of
the skin. We are concerned solely with the fact that, out of the hundreds of stimuli
radiatingfromthequalitiesofthemammal'sbody,onlythreebecomethebearersof
receptor cues for the tick. Why just these three and no others? (Uexku È ll 1957: 11)
The answer for Uexku È ll is that living organisms respond to perceptual
signs (Merkzeichen) or `meaning' (Bedeutung),
6 not to causal impulses.
7
Physical, chemical, or thermal changes to the receptor organs are inter-
preted as signs of the (not yet perceptible) `perceptual cues' of an object, as
a counterpart for a speci®c behavior. Uexku È ll argues that the `subject'
(tick) and `object' (mammal) dovetail into one another and constitute a
systematic whole or functional cycle. The organism or interpreter receives
signsfromitsenvironmentandtheseperceptualsignstriggerspeci®caction
impulses or operation signs (Wirkzeichen). The whole cycle is a process
not made of static objects but of sign relations Ð a semiosis. For example,
with the tick there are three functional cycles following each other in
processual succession: (1) the mammal's skin glands are the sites of per-
ceptualmeaninginthe®rstcycle.Thebutyricacidtriggersperceptualsigns
in the tick that induce the tick to let go of the twig and fall (with luck)
ontothe passing mammal; (2)themammal'shairnowproducesperceptual
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skin is found; (3) the temperature of the mammal's bare skin triggers
perceptual signs in the tick that initiate the piercing process with the tick's
proboscis.
8
Inthisfunctionalcyclethemammal(object)isaconnectinglinkbetween
the tick's eectors and receptors, which metaphorically `grasp' the object
like the two jaws of a pair of pincers (`a double articulation'). The `per-
ceptual jaw' gives perceptual meaning to the object, and the `operational
jaw' an eector meaning. For Uexku È ll there is a counterpoint or
contrapuntal relation between the organism as a `meaning-utilizer' or inter-
pretant, and the perceptual cues or `meaning-factors' of the object Ð
Nature as music.
9 The form of living beings develop in a kind of natural
contrapuntal `harmony' or refrain, with each other and their environ-
ment.
10 Uexku È ll (1982: 53) gives the example of the octopus, designated as
the subject in its relation to sea-water as the meaning carrier. In this
scenario the fact that water cannot be compressed is the precondition
for the construction of the octopus' muscular swim-bag. The pumping
movement of the swim bag on the noncompressible water propels the
animalbackwards. Uexku È llclaims thattherulethatgovernstheproperties
of sea-water acts on the protoplasm of the octopus thereby shaping the
melody of the development of the octopus form to express the properties
of sea-water. The rule of meaning that joins point and counterpoint is
expressed in the action of swimming Ð an energetic interpretant!
So the Umwelt is a model of a species' signi®cant surroundings. The
essential claim is that organisms interpret their environment and are not
merely the passive objects of natural selection, as emphasized by con-
temporary Darwinian evolutionary biology. The Umwelt consists of
signi®cant sign relationships. However, Uexku È ll, in the prevailing context
of Kantian idealism, presented Umwelten as subjective appearances or
phenomena, and thought of his Umwelt research as a con®rmation of
a Kantian philosophy of mind:
All reality is subjective appearance. This must constitute the great, fundamental
admission even of biology. It is utterly in vain to go seeking in the world for causes
that are independent of the subject; we always come up against objects which owe
their construction to the subject.
When we admit that objects are appearances that owe their construction to
a subject, we tread on ®rm and ancient ground, especially prepared by Kant
to bear the edi®ce of the whole of natural science. Kant set the subject, man over
against objects, and discovered the fundamental principles according to which
objects are built up from the mind. (Uexku È ll 1926: xv)
Before examining the contemporary value and semiotic use of the concept
of Umwelt, freed from a needlessly unsemiotic Kantian philosophy of
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of Uexku È ll's work.
The key is the concept of the univocity of being. In his Vincennes
seminar, Deleuze (1974) articulates Uexku È ll's work by moving from the
concept of the univocity of being to a Spinozist interpretation of Uexku È ll's
nascent biosemiotics. For Deleuze, Duns Scotus only thought univocal
being whereas Spinoza arms it with one Nature for all individuals,
11
and Uexku È ll's Umwelt theory becomes an expression of the univocity of
being! How does this truly creative and remarkable proposition work
(not unlike John Poinsot grasping the formal sign as an ontological
relation in 1632 Ð the year Spinoza is born) and in what way might it
be further articulated with the being of ontological relations?
Deleuze (1974) makes a `terminological detour' through the Middle
Ages and seventeenth century (the philosophical black hole of the between
times). This trajectory is, in fact, obligatory, as one has to go back this far
to rediscover ontology and its relevance to an onto-logic of signs. For
Deleuze this detour concerns the problem of the nature of being which was
discussedbythescholasticseminarians intermsofequivocity,analogy,and
univocity. He emphasizes that these scholastic discussions still have
concrete relevance for us because we continue to think with these terms
even if we are not aware of them.
Tostatethat`beingisequivocal'meansthat`beingissaidinseveralsenses
of that which it is said'. For example, being is said in a dierent way of
God, animals, and tables. They have dierent kinds of being and there
is no common measure between these equivocal senses of being.
To state that `being is analogical' means that `being is said in several
senses of that which it is said, but these senses are not without common
measure: they are governed by relations of analogy'. This was the canonical
interpretation of Aquinas and it is intimately linked to the concept of the
categories (e.g., substance, quantity, relation) or categorial thinking of
Aristotle or Kant. The categories are the concepts which are said of every
possible object of experience Ð in other words the categories are that
which is said of the dierent senses of the word `being'. Deleuze gives the
example of the `object' lion which is not a category because one cannot
say `lion of every object of experience' (one, of course, can do this at the
risk of being placed in a mental asylum). Thus categorial thought is
analogical because the categories are applied to the dierent senses of the
word `being'.
Deleuze de®nes the univocity of being thus: univocal being `has only
one sense and is said in one and the same sense of everything of which it is
said'. This is the thesis of Duns Scotus. Deleuze understands this as a
`pre-categorial' and pre-analogical thought Ð `a mad thought' Ð which
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nant `hallucination point of thought'. How can we say that God and ticks,
trees and stones, imaginary worlds and impossible objects (e.g., a square
circle) have one sense, or univocal being?
Now it is possible at this point to sense that one is beginning to drown
in a set of sterile debates that have absolutely no relevance to our
experience. I have no mastery of scholasticism, nor of the history of
philosophy (nor do I aspire to this) but there is something interesting
happening here that I would like to focus on.
12
Duns Scotus is not seeking to completely eliminate analogy from the
concept of being but to show that it cannot be exclusively analogous.
Hedoesnotexcludeanalogybutallowsforitspossibility.Hisfundamental
point is that unless there is a univocal concept of being common to the
analogous ones, they will not be analogous but equivocal! In fact,
he arms that although being is metaphysically or logically univocal,
in the order of entitative physical being it is analogical. Deleuze notes
that without this distinction univocity would become heresy and lead to
unpleasant consequences at the stake.
If I say being is univocal, this means: there is no categorical dierence between
the assumed senses of the word `being' and being is said in one and the same sense
of everything which is. In a certain manner this means that the tick is God; there is
no dierence of category, there is no dierence of substance, there is no dierence
of form. It becomes a mad thought. (Deleuze 1974: 3)
Scouts does not go this far. His motive is to safeguard both the possibility
of our knowledge of God and give metaphysics its proper object in a
univocal concept of being. He thought this would distinguish metaphysics
(as a science of being qua being) from physics portrayed as concerned
with the reality of singular physical existents (ens realis).
Now Scotus argues, following Avicenna, that if being is univocal it
follows that being is the primary object of the intellect, preceding any
particular notion of being as applied to God or creatures (e.g., in®nite or
®nite Ð being-as-®rst-known is neither in®nite nor ®nite). The intellect
or understanding has its own proper object or primum intelligibile, just as
sound is to hearing (primum audibile) or light to seeing (primum visibile).
The object of the intellect or understanding is ens primum cognitum, being-
as-®rst-known. Avicenna had made being the primary object of the
intellect, in contradistinction to either God or substance, the proper
subject of metaphysics. Scotus adopts this position with his own nuances
that I will not pursue here.
So what? Deely will claim that John Poinsot's conception of the
coinciding univocal being of relations in objective existence (i.e., as
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tions are truly relations and distinct or `external' to their terms, whether
posited as mental or physical), is grounded in the univocity of the primary
object of the intellect, ens primum cognitum, as understood by Avicenna.
The ontological rationale of relation is univocal, neither physical nor
psychical, although capable of being either depending on the particular
circumstances.Relationsaretransversal,theycanpassfreelyfromwhatwe
consider mind-dependent to mind-independent and vice-versa. Relations
in their univocal being as `objective' relations are neither `real' nor `ideal'
although at any given hic et nunc they will be one or the other Ð the
ultimate abstract machine. There is much here to consider! For Deely it
is this univocity that allows for both semiosis (the action of signs) as
the being proper to experience and the consequent ¯uid intermixing of
`nature' and `culture' in our experience as constituted through ontological
sign relations in anthroposemiosis Ð the human use of signs Ð the
semiotic web or labile, osmotic, limitless interface secreting interiority and
exteriority. `An outside more distant than any external world because it is
an inside deeper than any internal world: it is immanence _ the incessant
to-ing and froing of the plane, in®nite movement' (Deleuze and Guattari
1996: 59).
Univocal becoming
What is of particular interest is that both Deleuze and Poinsot (mediated
to us by Deely) emphasize that there is something about univocal being
that is pre-categorial. The `problem of the unity of Being as over against
the multiplicity of categories applied to things' (Heidegger 1962: 23).
Poinsot'sdoctrineofsignsisamorefundamentalontologyinthattheaction
of signs as the medium of communication is presupposed by any system of
categories and it is semiosis, the action of signs, that allows for the
subsequent construction of categorial schemas. Traditional Aristotelian
natural philosophy was concerned with the structure of ens reale, or mind-
independent existence understood in terms of substances or units of
independent existence and their accidents or properties and character-
istics. Poinsot's creative genius is to undercut this categorial approach
by showing that it is from within our experience that being is divided
up between the mind-dependent (ens rationis) and mind-independent (ens
reale) and that these two kinds of being come together in the sign under-
stood as an ontological relation. Poinsot realizes that the formal sign
is an ontological relation, `external' to its terms. It is existentially insepar-
able, but, nevertheless, distinct from its foundation. A doctrine of signs or
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it is `idealist'. We can come to know of the mind-independent existence
of things because the ontology of the sign relation is univocal. The
ontological relation is neutral or indierent to its realization, whether in
nature or thought. Ontological relation is contrasted with the transcen-
dental `relation' or rather the relativity of relative beings. A transcendental
relation is not a relation, but rather the fact that individual existents or
subjects are not relations, but relative beings. All being is `relative' but this
relativity is twofold Ð transcendental and ontological. That is to say,
within experience we ®nd that as soon as we wish to explain or understand
some individual existent we are obliged to take account of what those
individuals are not, namely their relations and dependencies upon things
otherthanthemselves (their ontologicalrelations).For example, the eyeor
visualsystemisnotarelation,butassoonaswewishtodiscourseaboutthe
eye we are forced by its manner of being to consider its relation to light.
I am not my mother (thank God) but I am related to my mother Ð that
relation is an ontological relation `over and above' my transcendentally
relative being, i.e., as an individual being dependent on many factors other
than my actual instantiation.
13
Poinsot's semiotic approach is pre-categorial because the sign `as the
medium of communication functions by distinguishing connections within
experience, and so is not only presupposed to any system of categories,
but is also the instrument of their establishment' (Deely 1985: 476). What
needs to be emphasized is that the sign is univocal in its being as an
ontologicalrelationandthatthisunivocityis`grounded'intheunivocityof
being-as-®rst-known, the primary object of the understanding.
Inotherwords:univocal,semioticrealityÐtherealityofexperience Ð is
neither reducible to the mind's own workings (e.g., as in the Kantian
synthesis) nor to that of a prejacent external physical world in which the
mind has no part. It is a limitless interface where the line between what
is and what is not independent of interpretive activity is a continually
shifting semiotic process. As Deely observes so well in numerous articles
14
what comes ®rst in experience is neither ens reale nor ens rationis.I ti s
through experience that being divides into what is not independent of
understanding (ens rationis) and what is independent of my understanding
(ens reale). Thus, there is a `prederivative' sense of being, and this `sense'
of being `whatever it be, is prior to being in either of the derived senses;
and it is this prior being Ð the being proper to experience Ð that semiotic
takes as its province' (Deely 1988b: 73). This priority of univocal being is
not a linear temporality which would be left behind, it is intrinsic to the
possibility of being able to predicate anything at all (e.g., `what is that?').
Univocal being is a `unique' or singular notion, sui generis. It is the
Umwelten 145
Brought to you by | Murdoch University Library
Authenticated | 134.115.4.99
Download Date | 1/25/13 6:23 AMhappening of experience, or the eventing of the event, neither `inside' nor
`outside' Ð the non-subjective `thisness' or hecceity of the signifying event
or action of semiosis. As we have noted Scotus is inspired by Avicenna in
hisunderstandingofunivocalbeing,asisDeleuze,whounderstands`sense'
in terms of Avicenna's univocity. For Deleuze it is the univocity of sense
thatallowstheescapefromthecircleoftheproposition.Weareestablished
`from the outset' within sense as that which allows for the articulation of
the dierence between things and propositions. Sense, or univocity, is
presupposed and is that which allows for the distinction between the
particular and the general. For Avicenna univocity is the third state of
essence, essence as sense, the `pure event', indierent to all opposites.
15
This Persian doctor and metaphysician (Ibn Sina) seems to be a critically
important and somewhat neglected conceptual persona.
16
In fact, we are able to see in hindsight that what Avicenna had given a name to
wasnothinglessthanthemateriaprimaofanthroposemiosis.Theprimumcognitum
of medieval thought turns out to be precisely what the linguistic sign informs
in enabling us through discourse to argue about what is and what is not in nature
as about how experience is and is not rightly to be interpreted in any given context
of discourse, including the metaphysical. (Deely 1988a: 8)
Deely will argue (with some reference to Heidegger Ð for the non-
languaging animal everything is ready-to-hand, not present-to-hand) that
this apprehension of univocal being by the understanding or intellect
is only available to animals operating in language (currently humans),
because language entails the grasping of relations of signi®cation, as such,
rather than perceptible aspects of things. Non-languaging animals are
aware of their surroundings and of relative beings, but not of the relations
themselves because they are not sense-perceptible. Univocal being
requires an understanding of something that is not perceptible and can
only be expressed through linguistic means. In such an incorporeal
scenario this would be what dierentiates human communication from
animal communication. We will inevitably return to this `problematic'
proposition!
Let us recapitulate: There is a pre-categorial, `prederivative' under-
standing of being (or sense) as univocal. It acts as the permeable, osmotic
interface or articulation between the orders of being and non-being, or
the mind-dependent and mind-independent as they are distinguished
in our experience. It allows for the communion between thought and
being. It is superior to any categorial standpoint in that it allows for
categorial interconnections by distinguishing connections or relations
within experience.
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basis for all semiotic explanation, and that the ontological explanation in the
traditional categories of substance and accident, to whatever extent it is valid,
is subordinate to the standpoint of semiotic by reason of being assimilable to
(and subsequently analytically derivable from) transcendental relation and
ontological relation generally. (Deely 1988b: 80)
Thus, as Deely often observes, semiotic is `an integral philosophy of
experience' that goes beyond either Aristotelian or Kantian categorial
thought. Aristotelian realist categories are concerned with nature as it
is supposed to exist independently of human thought. Kantian idealism
takes the opposite view, claiming that the order of beings as existing in
themselves is forever hidden from human understanding. The Kantian
categories represent universal forms or structures that are presupposed
to any judgments about the world of appearances or phenomena, not to
things in themselves. Deely argues throughout his work that although
Poinsot recognizes the inadequacy of the Aristotelian categorial schema
for the perspective of semiotic which understands experience as a product
of sign relations or semiosis, it is Peirce's semiotic categorial scheme
(Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness Ð which are three classes of rela-
tions Ð monadic, dyadic, and triadic) that begins to truly develop this
realization of the interpenetration within experience of a `living tissue' of
sign relations that does not preclude mind-independent elements from
experience (as does the Kantian schema). This interpenetration within
experienceof`nature'and`culture'ispossiblebecauseoftheunivocalbeing
of the ontological sign relation (Peirce's thirdness as triadic relation)
in which they come together. Deely does indicate that in Hegel's Logic
(`Being, as the immediate indeterminate, is in fact nothing') there is a
confused recognition that not all relations are the work of the mind, but
that Hegel never clearly articulates their interrelation in experience, nor
adequately isolates the ontological rationale of the univocity of relation.
17
Furthermore, Deely will argue that it is Peirce's `semiotic categories'
that account for the transformation of the species-speci®c objective
world of the animal Umwelt into the species-speci®c objective world of
the human Lebenswelt, within which it is realized that its human Umwelt
(or Lebenswelt)i sdierent from, and not coextensive with the sense-
perceptible physical surroundings, and understands the imperceptible
relation of signi®cation as such. The `animal' remains captured by
its Umwelt which never becomes present to it as an Umwelt Ð although
it is clearly aware of sense-perceptible aspects of its surroundings.
(Heidegger will say the animal is `benumbed'.) Although Heidegger's
(1995) analysis is `violent and awkward' (Derrida 1991: 111), it is obvious
that Heidegger is struggling to dierentiate zoo È semiosis (as common to
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the necessary semiotic tools. The approach taken by Deely, is neither
anthropocentric/morphic (in fact, it precisely avoids misplaced linguistic
anthropomorphism), nor bad biology; it `simply' distinguishes between
dierent uses of sign relations. Physiosemiosis, phytosemiosis, zoo È semio-
sis, anthroposemiosis. The argument is that non-human animals use signs
and communicate, but they do not live in language, and do not grasp
imperceptible sign relations as such. Their apprehension terminates in
sense-perceptible aspects of the physical environment. Or, to be more
reserved, we can say that currently we have no knowledge of a non-human
linguistic animal that ipso facto grasps, or rather understands, the incor-
poreal sign relation as distinct from its terms. The species-speci®c human
Lebensweltariseswiththeawarenessofthedistinctionbetweentherelation
and the things it relates, thus allowing for the arbitrary systems of com-
munication that we designate as languages Ð and as a consequence for
textuality and the, in principle, in®nite malleability of the Lebenswelt.
Eugen Baer succinctly states the matter:
Semiotics [the human study of semiosis] begins ontogenetically as `a moment
of anthroposemiosis' with the insight that experience depends on the action of
signs. Once signs are recognized as imperceptible ontological relations which
correlate objects and/or things, we are at the threshold of what for Deely is
speci®cally anthroposemiotic, the ability to introduce into objects the dimension
of stipulability. This underlies the capacity for language and renders semiosis in
principleunlimited.Thestipulablesignisthecharacteristic traitofwhatDeelycalls
`text'. And it is this capacity to produce texts that distinguishes anthroposemiosis
from zoo È semiosis. It is species-speci®c for human semiosis.
What exactly is textuality? Texts are strings of signs that are in principle
exchangeable(substitutable)withothersignsinaccordancewithagivencode.Texts
are thus transformable from one set of objects to another, precisely because their
`being' resides not in things or objects, but `in-between' them. (Baer 1992: 355±356)
Both Bergson and Ruyer (who are both major in¯uences on Deleuze and
Guattari's work) make a similar distinction, although less analytically
nuanced, between the animal and human animal use of signs. Ansell-
Pearson (1999: 54) reminds us that for Bergson in Creative Evolution, the
instinctive signs which characterize the language of insects are limited and
attached to speci®c objects, `the sign is adherent to the thing signi®ed'
(Bergson 1975: 174). What characterizes human language is the ability of
signs to be transferred from one object to another; they become in®nitely
`mobile' rather than `adherent' Ð `the intelligent sign is mobile' (Bergson
1975: 175). There is a dierence in kind between the human and animal
use of signs (moreover, animals don't know they are using signs!). In fact,
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between formal and instrumental signs and the fact that `ideas' are imper-
ceptible formal signs. The word is an `external thing' (i.e., an instrumental
sign) and an `immaterial thing' or idea (i.e., a formal sign). The main
insight of Bergson is that without language, as the awareness of the
relation of signi®cation, which allows the sign to be `mobile' (or deter-
ritorialized), the animal is `riveted' to materially present sense-perceptible
objects Ð the animal is captured or riveted to an Umwelt, whereas the
human animal lives with the understanding of being-in-an-Umwelt
and can play with the relations that constitute it, thereby having the
possibility, amongst others, of developing and discussing philosophies of
life and semiotics.
Ruyer (1964) makes essentially the same observation when discussing
thewell known case of the blind, deaf, mute, HelenKeller. Ruyer discusses
the matter in terms of the dierence between the animal's use of stimulus-
signals and the human's grasp of sign-symbols. The dierence being that
the human animal grasps the relation of signi®cation as such:
To understand a signal as a signal, following a conditioning process, is not at all
tounderstanditasasymbol.Onthecontrarythesignal-functionblocksthesymbol
function. The decisive point for Helen Keller is that `water' wasn't necessarily a
sign-signal by which water was requested or expected, but was `the name of the
substance whereby it could be mentioned, conceived, remembered, celebrated.' At
that moment, the meaning, for her, of the word `water' could not be interpreted as
thelastphaseofaconditioning.AslongasoneattemptedtoconditionHelenKellerto
a word, one in fact prevented her from understanding what language was. It was
necessary that she suddenly realized that the word had a meaning. A discovery that
leads to the discovery that everything has a name, and that every name had a
meaning. From now on she was no longer in an animal Umwelt, but in the world.
(Ruyer 1964: 98±99)
18
In fact, Deleuze and Guattari make a related observation in A
Thousand Plateaus (1988) when they refer to the well known example
of the bees dance studied by Karl von Frisch (1950) as taken up by
Emile Benveniste. Deleuze and Guattari are claiming in the plateau
(Postulates of Linguistics) that the ®rst determination of language is not
trope or metaphor but indirect discourse. The bee
has no language because it can communicate what it has seen but not transmit
what has been communicated to it. A bee that has seen a food source can com-
municatethemessagetobeesthatdidnotseeit,butabeethathasnotseenitcannot
transmit the message to others that did not see it. (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 77)
For Deleuze and Guattari language has to be able to go from a second to
a third party, neither of whom has seen. Language is deterritorialized
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on Frisch's work, what this means is that bees use signs Ð and they do not
know they are using signs. The bees dance is no more a language than the
fact of a dog sitting when his owner says `sit'.
19
Deleuze and Guattari will argue, following Spinoza's medieval ethics
and proto-ethology, that a thing, animal, or person are de®ned by move-
ments and rests, speeds and slownesses (longitude) and by aects
(intensities) latitude. These are assemblages or hecceities (taking up and
modifying Duns Scotus' term) which are not individuations of an already
individuated object or person, but of relational events that can include,
for example, a time of day, a season, or anything at all _ a text, a social
body. This is also called a plane of immanence or of composition having
no supplementary dimension Ð an abstract machine. It is a plane with
n dimensions growing and contracting with respect to the relations and
assemblages being formed and dissolved between relative beings. An event
in which both `subjects' and `objects' are being produced and linked
throughrelationsbetweenthetwo(relativebeingsandtherelationstheyare
involved in) Ð Interbeing, always in the middle. `HECCEITY=EVENT'.
Deleuze and Guattari claim that beings are distinguished not ana-
logically in terms of genus or species, but by their degrees of `power' which
corresponds to a certain capacity to be aected. They construct a univocal
Spinozist ethology or cartography of aective capacities. The univocity
of being is expressed through one determining factor: what are the
aections or relations that a being can enter into Ð what assemblages can
it participate in Ð what are its becomings? The only dierence from the
point of view of univocal being is the dierent relations that a being can
enterinto.UnivocityforDeleuze`issaid'ofcompletelydierent,equivocal
beings (boy, table, girl, train, god). `A single and same voice for the
whole thousand-voiced multiple' (Deleuze 1994: 304). This is no longer
a conception of genera and species but of the assemblages into which each
being is capable of entering. In other words a being is de®ned by the
relationsandassemblagesitcanenterintoÐtellmewhatrelationsyoucan
enter into, and I will tell you who you are. These relations, as the relations
of relative beings, are univocal in their being as relations. And this gives
us precisely the distinction in our experience, between relative beings
and their relations prior to a categorial schema. Deleuze puts it thus:
`so an animal, a thing is never separable from its relations with the
world' (Deleuze 1988: 125). Gregory Bateson and many other biologists
will make the same observation Ð for Bateson the `unit of survival' was
organism+environment.
In Deleuze and Guattari (1988) (the book of subjectless events and
becomings) this approach is illustrated with (among many other striking
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of its aective capacities or relations, rather than in terms of physiology.
As Ansell-Pearson notes in a brief but insightful encounter with the work
of Deely,
20 that this is a `semiotics of aect' (Ansell-Pearson 1999: 187)
in which Uexku È ll's Umwelt theory and concept of organism can be
understood in terms of the scholastic notion of `species' rather than
in Darwinian terms of relations of descent. The organism does indeed
inhabit a `species-speci®c objective word' (the expression is Deely's) in
that its world is speci®c to its biological type; but also because its `species'
whetherimpressedorexpressedarewhatmakesits`world'.Andaswehave
already noted, at some length, scholastic expressed `species' are formal
signs or interpretants that are not `subjective' or in the modern classical
sense. Their whole being as ontological relations is in `being-toward.'
This is what makes Umwelten `objective', or open worlds, rather than
`subjective', closed worlds. Objective worlds are not in binary opposition
with the modern sense of subjective. Objective worlds as experienced
include a shifting amalgam of mind-dependent and mind-independent
aspects(orthe`psychical'and`physical')throughtheunivocalbeingofsign
relations. This dynamic is what allows for the enterprise of constructive
scienti®c realism, through the critical control of objecti®cation and the
possibility that some theories remain purely objective ®ctions (i.e., with
no physical lining), or return to the status of ®ctions (e.g., the ether,
phlogiston) and others become `objective' testimonies to nature's subjec-
tive being (i.e., its being independently of being known). For example, the
earth's tectonic plates now drift and collide, over and above our thinking
that they do, although for many years such a `®ction' was ridiculed. Some
things are not reducible to our experience of them, but paradoxically
become more substantiated and `in-themselves' the more we are related
to them, or the more they are experienced Ð `the truth of the relative' or
the truth of relations.
21
Species-speci®c objective worlds
A recapitulation: Deely has systematically and continously argued for the
importance of the notion of Umwelt or species-speci®c worlds for under-
standing the action and being of signs in the constitution of an objective
world, i.e., a world to the extent that it exists in any way as known.
As experienced, the physical world is objective, it is an object of awareness.
The distinction between objects of experience that are only objects of
experience and those that are also physical existents also occurs within
experience(whichleadssomethinkerstoanidealisminwhichexperienceis
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representations). Experience is not locked into realism or idealism, it is
univocal in its being, including both the constructions of the mind and
elements that are not reducible to the mind's constructive capacity.
Instead of a dichotomy between subjective (observer dependent)
and inaccessible objective (observer independent) there is a trichotomy,
or triadic semiotic relation, including an experiencing organism (or
interpretant), the object experienced, and the basis on which the object
exists as experienced. I will present an extended quotation from Deely
which I would suggest indicates that semiotics has fortunately progressed,
in his hands, beyond anything Heidegger's phenomenology was able to
articulate:
That in which experience consists in the being proper to it is the sign relation,
or rather, the network of sign relations colorfully called `the semiotic web' by
Thomas Sebeok in a metaphor borrowed from the German biologist Jakob von
Uexku È ll. This web is, on the one side, superordinate to physical nature _, on the
other side, subordinate to the constitution of the knower (the cognitive organism).
The being proper to experience is not the being of objects, still less the being of
things. It is the being proper to the network of interpretive relations according
to which the cognitive organism is inserted in the environment not merely as one
physical thing among others (one substance with its accidents among other
substances with their accidents), but as a being whose objective world is shot
through and constituted by cares and interests species-speci®cally proper to it
according to its biological constitution. Beyond this, in the case of human beings,
the objective world is further structured through linguistic relations (a species-
unique type of semiotic relation) which convey a cultural heritage linked, not
directly, but indirectly only, to a speci®c biological constitution. `Being-in-a-
world', that is to say, an objective world as distinct from a merely physical
environment, is not something uniquely human, though `being-in-a-world' that
has the texture of linguistic understanding woven into its fabric or perceptual and
sensory objects is uniquely human. (Deely 1992: 309)
Which returns us to the dierence between the animal Umwelt and the
human animal Umwelt, or Lebenswelt, as Deely will sometimes call it. As
we have already noted, this distinction lies in the peculiarity of the human
animal's ability to interact and play with pure relations. This is equivalent
to the emergence of language and allows for the possibility of inventing
the Umwelt in ways that are not strictly proportionate to biologically
determined positive, negative, or indierent aects. Deely gives the
example of legal systems which distribute property not on the basis of
species territoriality but `according to an abstract plan of objective
boundaries imposed upon the physical environment as identi®ed with
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Iowa from Illinois for a certain stretch' (Deely 1994a: 221). The essential
point here is that the human Umwelt is not `riveted' or `captured' by its
species-speci®c world, as Bergson would say, but is able, through the
human understanding of relations as distinct from related objects, to
restructure its Umwelt in in®nite ways Ð an unbounded semiosis
within anthroposemiosis. A human-becoming itself in its unlimitedness.
As Deely notes (1994a: 218±219) the notion of Umwelten or species-
speci®c worlds is now well established in semiotic studies to distinguish
between the prejacent physical environment and the objective world of an
organism.
22 Uexku È ll imagined the Umwelt as like an invisible bubble
surrounding the organism:
_ we must ®rst blow, in fancy, a soap bubble around each creature to represent its
own world, ®lled with the perceptions which it alone knows. When we ourselves
step into one of these bubbles, the familiar meadow is transformed. Many of its
colorful features disappear, others no longer belong together but appear in new
relationships. A new world comes into being. (Uexku È ll 1957: 5)
In the same extraordinary work Uexku È ll also compared the Umwelt
or world of experience to a spider's web. `As the spider spins its threads,
every object spins his relations to certain characters of the things around
him, and weaves them into a ®rm web which carries his existence' (Uexku È ll
1957: 12). The semiotic web.
In order to illustrate the constitution of an objective world Deely
(1994a: 219) combines these two notions `into the single model of a kind
of geodesic sphere whose interior as well as its surface consists of a series
of intersecting lines'. He notes that the spherical image is only analogous
as the surface of the `sphere' is irregular and determined by the radii rela-
tions linking the individual with elements of its physical surroundings
(some of which are very close and some `as far as alien galaxies'). The
model is so valuable and interesting that I will quote from Deely's own
work which would be absurd to paraphrase:
Eachintersection isanobject,eachlinearelationship.Lines radiateoutwardsfrom
the center where each of us stands to the surface of the sphere, and lines extend
also crosswise, intersection the radii. The radii lines represent relations between
ideas and objects, the intersecting lines represent relations between objects, and
the intersections themselves represent the objects. Thus, the objective world is
the sphere of an individual's experiences built up out of relationships, and the
internal constitution of this sphere is precisely that of a web the various inter-
sections of whose strands present to us the objects according to the meaning of
which we lead our lives. At the center of such a three-dimensional spider's web,
by maintaining and elaborating it, we live our lives. (Deely 1994a: 219)
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sphere of experience is a `virtual intersection or interface between nature
and culture'. The external senses guarantee that elements of the physical
surroundings are objecti®ed in experience in interaction with our bodies.
Now this model of experience is further (and in®nitely) complexi®ed by
memory and imagination which add new radii and further intersections.
Thus, there are incorporated into this web of experience elements that
do not correspond to actual physical environmental in¯uences. Now,
as Uexku È ll and Deely note, this web of experience is determined by
the biological constitution of the organism or species Ð it is a species-
speci®c objective world. As we have already had occasion to observe
human animals understand the relational strands themselves which
structure sense-perceptible objects and which can now be used to
restructure the Umwelt, starting with the realization that it is an Umwelt!
And then perhaps wondering what other Umwelten are like, which as
Deely observes is a priori impossible in the original Kantian scheme.
Either Umweltensforschung is a form of transcendental illusion, or, if, for
example, von Frisch really did interpret with some exactness the bee's dance or
von Uexku È ll the toad's search image Ð then von Uexku È ll, in extending Kant's
ideas to biology, wasdoing somethingmore, something thatthe Kantian paradigm
did not allow for, namely, achieving objectively and grasping as such an
intersubjective correspondence between subjectivities attained through the sign
relation. (Deely 1990: 123)
Deely argues that Uexku È ll is going beyond the Kantian paradigm in spite
ofhimself.Uexku È llsawthe Umwelt asa`subjective'orphenomenal world,
asopposedtoan`objective'world,butthesemioticapproachtoexperience
cannot be assimilated to Kantian idealism or any simple realism. Semiotic
reality is an interpenetration of the mind's own constructs together
with aspects of a mind-independent environment woven seamlessly
together in the ontological univocity of sign relations. Semiotic objectivity
(esse objectivum/objective being), as we have had much occasion to note,
is not assimilable to the modern opposition between subjective and
objective. It is`the truthof the relative'.Objectivity in this sense is opposed
to both subjectivity and objectivity as understood in classical modern
idealism. As Deely notes (1990: 122) the reappropriation of the scholastic
notion of objectivity (particularly as formulated by Poinsot Ð and
implicitly developed by Peirce) is `necessary to make sense of the very title
vonUexku È llgivestoamainsectioninoneofhiskeyessays[1957:73],``The
same subject as an object in dierent Umwelten'''.
This kind of objectivity is engendered by Peirce's interpretant or proper
signi®cate outcome of a sign which makes present an object other than
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dyadic physical interactions. Guattari (1995) suggests we should place the
concept of an enlarged de®nition of `subjectivity' within this relational
perspective:
So we are proposing to decentre the question of the subject onto the question
of subjectivity. Traditionally, the subject was conceived as the ultimate essence
of individuation, as a pure, empty, prere¯exive apprehension of the world, a
nucleus of sensibility, of expressivity Ð the uni®er of states of consciousness.
With subjectivity we place the emphasis instead on the founding instance of
intentionality [which is derived from relationality] This involves taking the rela-
tion between subject and object by the middle and foregrounding the expressive
instance (or the interpretant of the Peirceian triad). (Guattari 1995: 22)
For Guattari it was imperative to enlarge the de®nition of subjectivity
beyond the classical opposition between individualsubject andsocietyand
all his work involved developing a more `transversalist' or 'schizoanalytic'
approach to subjectivity that recognized the importance of non-linguistic
elements irreducible to the linguistic analysis of the Saussurean tradition.
Guattari armed the value and importance of Peirce's semiotics over
and above European semiology throughout his work and in Chaosmosis
(Guattari 1995) takes up Peirce's concept of the diagram as an `icon of
relation'.
23 It should also be noted that part of Deely's contribution to
the commonwealth of ideas lies in his being one of the most astute con-
temporary readers and innovators of a post-Perceian semiotics capable
of doing justice to our experience, rather than engaging in elaborate
feats of explaining it away.
Heideggerian Umwelten
Heidegger (1995),insomeofhismostrelentlessandstunninglybenumbing
re¯ections, presents the thesis that `the animal is poor in world'.
24 I will
not attempt here to give a complete account of Heidegger's 1929±30
biology lectures,
25 but simply attempt to indicate the relation between
Heidegger, Peirce, and Deely and thereby demonstrate the contemporary
relevance of a semiotic appropriation and reformulation of Uexku È ll's
Umwelt theory.
26
As Ansell-Pearson notes (1999: 188, 240) there is an aspect of Uexku È ll's
theory that is not fully developed in Deleuze and Guattari's approach,
namely, that there is a `becoming' intrinsic to the activity of the animal-
Umwelt. `In other words, the peculiar `animality' of the animal is not
simplysomething`given',andthereneedstobepositedananimalbecoming
as well as a becoming-animal. For Heidegger (and many others in their
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environment and is thus `poor in world.' What might this perhaps
troubling and `problematic' expression mean?
As apossible theme for a fundamental problem of metaphysics Heidegger
asks the question What is World? And as a strategy for dealing with
this question he undertakes a comparative examination of three theses:
the stone is worldless, the animal is poor in world, man is world-forming.
Heidegger starts from the middle by asking what it means to say that
the animal is poor in world and quickly notes (Heidegger 1995: 192) that
at ®rst sight this thesis appears `to run directly counter to the most
penetrating fundamental re¯ections in biology and zoology, when we
consider that ever since J. von Uexku È ll we have all become accustomed
to talking about the environmental world of the animal'. How does
Heidegger deal with this apparent contradiction? His thesis unfolds in
the following way:
Being poor in world implies poverty in the sense of possessing less.
But less of what? (Heidegger 1995: 193). Heidegger, taking many of his
examples from Uexku È ll, starts with the proposition that the animal has
fewer relationships than human Dasein has at its disposal. For example,
thebee,thefrog,orthechanchoperatewithinastrictlylimiteddomainof
relations, but there is something more crucial than this. Heidegger will
claim that the manner in which an animal can `penetrate' whatever is
accessible to it is also limited. His fundamental claim, which will be
continually reworked and examined, is that the animal does not know
things as things. As a ®rst approximation it lacks the structure of the
apophantic as. This is, in fact, strikingly close to Deleuze and Guattari's
(1988) analysis (especially in the plateau `The geology of morals').
A threshold of deterritorialization is crossed wherein
the scienti®c world (Welt, as opposed to the Umwelt of the animal) [allows for]
the translation of all the ¯ows, particles, codes, and territorialities of the other
strata into a suciently deterritorialized system of signs, in other words into an
overcoding speci®c to language. (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 62)
The worker bee is familiar with the color and scent of the blossoms it
frequents but does not know the stamens of these blossoms as stamens.
Nor does it know of the number of leaves or of the roots of the plant.
Contrarytotheanimal,Heideggerwillarguethattheworldofmanismore
extensivebothinitspenetrability`andinrespecttothemannerinwhichwe
canpenetrateevermoredeeplyinthispenetrability'(Heidegger1995:193).
This is why man is characterized as world-forming. Heidegger emphasizes
that at this point in the analysis there is no question of claiming some
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animal.
To get closer to understanding the sense of word poverty Heidegger
turns in his comparative examination to the stone which is worldless.
The stone lies on the path but does not touch the path. Everything around
the stone is inaccessible to the stone itself (Heidegger 1995: 197). The stone
isnot deprivedof anything(it isnot poor inworld) because ithas noaccess
to the beings amongst which it turns up. Thus there is a distinction
emerging between the speci®c manner of being pertaining to animals,
and the speci®c manner of being pertaining to a material thing. The rock
is given in some way to the lizard but not as a rock Ð the rock is not
accessible to the lizard as a being. The blade of grass is a `beetle-path' for
the beetle, but it is not a blade of grass. Heidegger will claim that the
metaphysical signi®cance of the speci®c relationships of animals with their
environments has never been fully appreciated. If the animal has some
accesstothebeings arounditinawaythatthestonedoesnot,theanimalis
not deprived of world, but has world.
Heideggerfranklyadmitsthatthepreliminaryresultsofhiscomparative
examination are perplexing and apparently logically impossible: `the
animal reveals itself as a being which both has and does not have world.
He argues that concept of world must therefore need further clari®cation.
I will pass over the discussion of solipsistic, modern idealism (Descartes,
Kant, Hegel) in which man is initially understood as subject and con-
sciousness, existing in its own isolated `ego-sphere', and take the story up
with Heidegger's clari®cation of the `proper being or proper peculiarity
as the manner of being speci®c to the animal and its way of being proper
to itself '( Sich-zu-eigen-sein) (Heidegger 1995: 231). In distinguishing
the organism from a machine Heidegger (like many others) notes that
the `peculiar' character of the organism lies in its `capacity' for self-
production, or self-preservation. What is this autopoietic, `subjectless
self'?
The capacity for molecular self-production indicates a kind of boot-
strapping or circular production in which the capacity of the organism
to produce itself `does not leave itself behind' (Heidegger 1995: 233), or
escape itself. To use Heidegger's novel terminology the capacity for
self-production remains proper to itself without any self-consciousness or
re¯ection. The essential being of this self-productive capacity is properly
peculiar (Eigen-tuÈmlichkeit). Heidegger reserves the expression `self'
and selfhood for the speci®cally human peculiarity of possessing re¯ection
and consciousness beyond the proper peculiarity of self-production or
autopoiesis, proper to all organisms including human animals.
27 The
proper being of the animal or of animality (and Deleuze notes human
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lies in this proper peculiarity of self-production and possession which does
not lose itself but rather remains `its self' in this autopoietic drive or
capacity. This drive has a self-reserve and circular production which is not
re¯ective. Thus for Heidegger neither the animal's mode of being nor its
behavior direct themselves toward beings as such.
The essential lesson of this analysis is that ultimately, for Heidegger
(and Deely) the environing world (Umgebung), or Umwelt of the animal
is ready-to-hand but not present-at-hand. The animal is open to its sur-
roundings, but not as a world that is not coextensive or reducible to the
prejacent environment. Heidegger gives detailed accounts of experiments
on bees (amongst other examples) recounted by Uexku È ll in Theoretical
Biology, to illustrate the thesis that the behavior of the animal (in this
case the bee) is not determined by the presence or absence of honey or
¯owers but by a play of inhibited and released drives. The bee is captured
by the sun and does not grasp the sun as such Ð it does not view the sun.
The animal is encircled by a ring of drives within which it is both open and
captivated Ð it is incapable of ever properly attending to something as
such (Heidegger 1995: 248). Heidegger is distinguishing this approach
from Uexku È ll who suggests that the animal lives an Umwelt as an Umwelt.
It will be in anthroposemiosis that this realization occurs. However,
Heidegger moderates the analysis:
This question now leads us toward the distinction we tried to express by talking
of man's world-forming and the animal's poverty in world, a poverty which, roughly
put, is nonetheless a kind of wealth. The diculty of the problem lies in the fact
that in our questioning we always and inevitably interpret the poverty in world
and the peculiar encirclement proper to the animal in such a way that we end up
talking as if that which the animal relates to and the manner in which it does so
were some being, and as if the relation involved were an ontological relation that
is manifest to the animal. The fact that this is not the case forces us to claim that
the essence of life can become accessible only if we consider it in a deconstructive
[abbauenden] fashion. But this does not mean that life represents something
inferior or some kind of lower level in comparison with human Dasein. On the
contrary, life is a domain which possesses a wealth of openness with which the
human world may have nothing to compare. (Heidegger 1995: 255)
Deely claims that although Heidegger makes use of the term `ontological
relation' he does not have the univocal concept of it as developed by
Poinsot.
28 The ontological relation is not manifest to the animal because it
is imperceptible, and in its proper univocal being neither mind-dependent
nor mind-independent (although it will be one or the other at any given hic
and nunc). Animals can be aware of `absent signi®eds' (objects that are
not actually present) but these absent objects would always have some
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`ethereal linkage itself between the terms', can be understood but not seen
or touched (Deely 1993: 261). As Deely emphasizes animals see related
things but not the relations (which can only be understood, not perceived).
The human being by distinguishing things from objects (and the relations
from both) within anthroposemiosis, can use the relations to create the
systems of communication we call languages. Maturana will argue in a
similar way, claiming that animals do not live in language although he
will suggest that some animals can begin to enter into language (as a
coordination of a coordination of acts) when living with languaging human
animals. However, Deely will claim that although animals can enter into
coordinations of coordinations of acts, as long as these coordinations
terminate in sense-perceptible objects language in its species-speci®c
human sense has not been attained. Animals communicate and are aware
of their surroundings, but not of their surroundings as surroundings, of
their Umwelt as an Umwelt or objective world grasped as a whole in
relation to itself, which requires a distinction of objects from things and
relations from both. This as Deleuze and Guattari observe is what
transforms an Umwelt into a Welt, or to use Deely's term a Lebenswelt.
It is a question of thresholds. The fact of Guattarian `non-human enun-
ciation', `proto-subjectivity', `ontological intensities', `speci®c enunciative
consistencies', or a `non-human for-itself' does not gainsay a distinction
between human and non-human enunciation.
29 What is remarkable in
Guattari's `fractal ontology' and `transversalist' enlargement of enuncia-
tion, is the refusal to accept the couplet Being-being as an ontological
binary digit and replace it with polyphonic Being and processes of
deterritorialization deployingparticularrelationsofalterity.
30Emphasisis
no longer placed on Being but on the manner of being, the machination
producing the existent (Guattari 1995: 108±109).
Deleuze and Guattari's (1996) appropriation of Ruyer's work gives
us one line of approach to the question of whether a robot (as it currently
exists) has an Umwelt.
31 To the extent that the robot is not a primary true
form', i.e., that it is not self-producing and does not have the `proper
peculiarity' of autopoietic systems, it cannot even have `poverty in
world' never mind an Umwelt!
32 Guattari (1995) will seek (developing an
approach already proposed by Staord Beer) to expand the concept of
autopoiesis, arguing that when one thinks in terms of the machinic
assemblages that machines constitute with human beings, `they become
ipso facto autopoietic'. This coupling between the biosphere and mech-
anosphere (and reworking of the concept of autopoiesis) allows for a
more complex approach to questions of non-human enunciation and
`a-signifying semiotics' which will not be developed further at this point.
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of categories'' his ``semiotic categories'', or ``categories of experience'',
because precisely what they do is account for the transformation of the
animal Umwelt into the human Lebenswelt'. I will conclude this article by
giving a short summary of Deely's argument.
The fundamental argument is that Peirce's category of Firstness, which
is for Deely equivalent to Avicenna's univocal being, or Aquinas' `being-
as-®rst-known' (primum intelligibile), (or within the context of this thesis
Deleuze's `sense'), provides for the intelligibility of the objective world
(Umwelt) presented in perception, apprehended in relation to itself. As
Deely notes:
Here, however, at the level of primum intelligibile, it is not a question of any given
object of perception being cognized in relation to itself. It is rather a question
of the objective world as such, the Umwelt as the totality of objecti®cation at any
given moment, being grasped in relation to itself. (1998: 220)
For Deely this is Peirce's category of `Firstness' `the conception of being
or existing independently of anything else' (CP 6.32); `the present in
general' (CP 1.547). It is the apprehension of the imperceptible `relation to
itself' that transforms the Umwelt into a welt or lebenswelt over and
above the naturally biologically determined Umwelt of zoo È semiosis. For
Deely it is at this point that Umwelt becomes present-at-hand rather
than ready-to-hand. Firstness as a species-speci®cally human mode of
apprehension establishes the possibility of asking the question `What
is that?':
The animal aware of its objective world [Umwelt] in such a fashion is alone
positioned to form the conception along with reality, and of a piece with it, of
otherness. Otherness (present-at-handness, in contrast to the ready-to-handness
which reduces the environment within objectivity to the level of that extension of
organismic dispositions which is the essence of an Umwelt proportioned to the
biological nature of the cognizing organism) arises precisely within experience
through `brute actions of one subject or substance on another, regardless of
law or of any third subject' (CP 5.469). It is `the conception of being relative to,
the conception of reaction with, something else' (CP 6.32). It is, in a word, the
conception of `something other', of one thing dierent from another thing within
the play of objects of awareness. The experience of otherness within ®rstness is the
motivation of every question of the form `What is that?' (Deely 1998: 226)
Deely concludes his account of the relevance of Peirce's `semiotic cate-
gories', which unlike Aristotle's or Kant's, are designed to express the
interweaving of mind-dependent and mind-independent relations in the
univocal being of the sign relation (as an ontological relation); by claiming
160 P. Bains
Brought to you by | Murdoch University Library
Authenticated | 134.115.4.99
Download Date | 1/25/13 6:23 AMthat although Heidegger does not have the clarity of Peirce's thought
on sign relations and their manner of being, what Heidegger does
contribute is an extraordinary analysis of the distinction within human
experience between objects and things subsumed within the concept of
being-as-®rst-known.
IwillconcludebysuggestingthatDeleuze's`logicofsense'shouldnotbe
ignored in any attempt to understand `things' as signs, and their `external'
relationsonaunivocalplaneofimmanence.
33Languageunderstoodasthe
relation between a proposition and thing is only possible because of the
incorporeality of univocal sense, attributed to bodies but distinguished
fromthem.Itisthe`event'ofsensethatallowsforlanguagetobeinrelation
with things. The question of the truth or falsity of a proposition requires
this primary univocity of sense and relation. Even a false proposition has a
sense. Deleuze thought that everything he wrote constituted a theory of
signs and both Deleuze and Guattari saw Peirce as the modern inventor of
semiotics.Asemioticsthattheycomplexifyfortheirownpeculiarpurposes
and which makes creative use of Jakob von Uexku È ll's pioneering work.
Notes
1. Latour (1999: 21) sets up an opposition between the postmodern as seeking `more
absence, more debunking, more negation, more deconstruction' and the nonmodern
which seeks `proof of presence, deployment, armation, and construction'.
2. The expression non-languaging will be developed throughout this article. What is at
issue is the extent to which animals other than humans grasp the relation of signi®cation
as such. The argument to be presented here is that non-human animals communicate
but do not live in language. They use signs without knowing they are using signs. Some
®nd this abduction shocking, arrogant, and anthropocentric. In doing so they conserve
a principle rather than exercise their understanding.
3. This is a critical issue for Professor Humberto Maturana (1980). The frog does not
`aim' at anything _ `What the frog's eye tells the frog's brain'.
4. There is a web site dedicated to furthering Jakob von Uexku È ll's work at:
nhttp://www.zbi.ee/*uexkullo.
5. Deleuze often refers to Uexku È ll's tick. Heidegger seems more fascinated or benumbed
by Uexku È ll's description of the being of the bee. `Beeing'.
6. Here `meaning' is like Peirce's `thirdness' Ð mediation or relation as an interpretive
process over and above dyadic physical interaction or `secondness'. The connecting
link of relations, that are necessarily `external' to their terms.
7. Bateson (1977) arms this in claiming that `mental process' (immanent to `mind' and
`nature') is triggered by `news of dierence', not energy. It is news of dierence that is
circulating Ð `the pattern that connects'. Bateson illustrates this with Uexku È ll's tick
(although he does not actually mention Uexku È ll).
A tick on the twig of a tree waits for the smell of butyric acid that would mean `mammal
intheneighbourhood'.Whenhesmellsthebutyricacid,hewillfallfromthetree.Butifhe
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and go to climb up another one. He can respond to the `fact' that something does not
happen. (Bateson 1977: 241)
8. Deleuze and Guattari often refer to Uexku È ll's work. In Deleuze (1993: 92±93) the
following passage occurs which is worthy of an extended quotation; it both beautifully
expresses the material we are engaging with and suggests that the human monad or soul
can sink to a level lower than that of the tick:
Thetiniestofallanimalshasglimmersthatcauseittorecognizeitsfood,itsenemies,and
sometimes its partner. If life implies a soul, it is because proteins already attest to an
activity of perception, discrimination, and distinction Ð in short, a `primary force' that
physical impulsions and chemical anities cannot explain _ If life has a soul, it is
because it perceives, distinguishes, or discriminates, and all animal psychology is ®rst
of all a psychology of perception. In most cases, the soul gets along quite well with a
very few clear or distinguished perceptions: the soul of the tick has three, including
a perception of light, an olfactory perception of its prey, and a tactile perception of the
best place to borrow,whileeverythingelse in the greatexpanseof Nature, which the tick
nevertheless conveys, is only a numbness, a dust of tiny dark, and scattered perceptions.
But if an animal scale exists, or an `evolution' in the animal series, it is insofar as
increasingly numerous dierential relations or a deepening order are determining a
zone of clear expression that is both more extensive and increasingly hermetic. Each of
the conscious perceptions that comprise the zone is associated with others in the in®nite
process of reciprocal determination _ Few monads fail to believe themselves damned
at certain moments of their existence. When their clear perceptions are now and again
extinguished, when they recede into the night Ð in relation to this the tick's life appears
to be singularly rich. But with freedom there also comes the moment when a soul is won
over to itself and can whisper a convalescent's astonishment, `My God, what did I do in
all of these years?' (Deleuze 1993: 92±93)
9. The title of an unpublished article by Professor Keith Ansell-Pearson of Warwick
University (as well as a term in Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 314, that refers to Uexku È ll).
I have appropriated parts of Keith's succint account of the relation between Uexku È ll's
ethology and Deleuze and Guattari's work.
10. Humberto Maturana will call this mutual speci®cation or contrapuntal relation
`structural coupling'. He once told me that Uexku È ll `had everything except the notion
of structural coupling' which is a more analytical and less musical account of nature's
`harmony'. Maturana does employ one example drawn from Uexku È ll's work:
A ¯y seen walking on a painting by Rembrandt does not interact with a painting
by Rembrandt. The painting of Rembrandt exists only in the space of human aesthetics,
and its properties, as they de®ne this cultural space, cannot interplay with the properties
of the walking ¯y. (Maturana 1980: 51).
Varela's `enaction' or `embodied action' is a version of Uexku È ll's Umwelt theory.
Cognition depends on various linked sensorimotor capacities (perceptors and
eectors Ð a double articulation). The organism `enacts' or `brings forth' (taking up
the Heideggerian hervorbringen) a world.
Varela (in a personal communication) sees Uexku È ll as having had a `good
intuition' but dismisses his semiotic approach as inadequate in accounting for the
generative mechanisms of meaning which Varela et al. (1991) try to engage with. In
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the concept of Umwelt. Their approach is in terms of observable neurophysiology and
a `naturalized' Husserlian phenomenology that does not seem to accept the `realist'
possibilities of a post-Peircian semiotics that includes external or ontological relations.
11. Consult Deleuze (1994), chapter one, `Dierence in itself', for Deleuze's complex
and original propositions on the univocity of being. Deleuze traces a complex path
through Scotus (thinking univocity), Spinoza (arming), and Nietzsche (realizing)
which I am not competent enough to engage with. The emphasis here is on the relevance
of univocity to relation as such. Deleuze likes grouping thinkers in threesomes. For
a logic of the event it will be the Stoics, Leibniz, Whitehead. For the logic of sense it
will be the Stoics, Gregory of Rimini, Meinong. Ultimately, in Deleuze and Guattari
(1996), it will be Spinoza who constructs `the best' plane of immanence. That is, one that
does not give in to any transcendent plane. A univocal plane Ð an abstract machine or
rhizosphere.
12. For the `serious student', Alliez (1996) engages with Scotus and the univocity of being.
I make no attempt to emulate his account which also makes reference to the ®ne article
byBoulnois(1989).ThenewRoutledgeEncyclopaedia ofPhilosophyhasa valuableentry
on Duns Scotus written by Barry Taylor.
13. Deely's classic account of ontological and transcendental relatives i.e., the two kinds
of relative being can be found in Appendix 1 (`Contrasting ontological and
transcendental relatives') of Deely 1994a; I base my account on his singular eorts.
14. See particularly Deely 1988a.
15. See Deleuze (1990: 34±35), for his reference to Avicenna.
16. One possible area of research would be the connections between Avicenna and Su®
`thought', particulary the Su® concept of imaginal worlds (Corbin 1978).
17. See Deely's brief discussion of Hegel in Deely 1985.
18. My translation. Ruyer was aware of Uexku È ll's work, which he also sought to free from
its Kantian heritage. See also Ruyer (1952), a work that signi®cantly in¯uences Deleuze
and Guattari's ®nal work (1996):
Note that von Uexku È ll, in his general philosophy [cf. Theoretical Biology, Preface], is
Kantian and confuses, as does Merleau-Ponty, comprehensive biology and critical
biology. For example: `All reality is subjective appearance. This must constitute the one
great, fundamental admission, even of biology'. We take his `word' in itself, without
reference to his general doctrine. (Ruyer 1952: 217)
19. It is important to understand that an animal can be aware of `absent signi®eds'. The
critical distinction is that a non-languaging animal is not aware of what are in principle
imperceptible objects, such as relations or linguistic objects.
20. I am encouraged to see that my interest in Deely's semiotic has infected/aected Keith
Ansell-Pearson's thoughts.
21. This univocal `truth of the relative' rather than the intrinsically negative `relativity of
truth' (tied to a subject) will be engaged with at another place and time. It is the
approach taken by thinkers such as Deleuze and Guattari, Latour, Stengers, and the
actual practice of science.
22. ThisofcoursebegsthequestionofwhetherrobotsorcomputershaveUmwelten.Wewill
get to this ...
23. For Deely's treatment of icons within a Poinsot/Peirce framework consult Deely 1986b.
24. Heidegger wanted The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics to be the ®rst lecture
series published in the Gesamtausgabe (Collected Works). It was ®rst published in
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Heidegger engage so extensively with experimental science, in particular the Umwelt
theory of Uexku È ll.
25. The most forceful criticism of Heidegger's biology lectures comes from Krell (1992). It
is certain that Heidegger's approach is awkward and I am not seeking to defend his
understanding. However, it remains a remarkable attempt which cannot be dismissed
out of hand. A semiotic approach in the line of Peirce/Deely oers a perhaps more
nuanced approach.
26. Deleuze and Guattari (1996: 183±186) also signi®cantly return to Uexku È ll's work,
suggesting that art begins with the animal, `at least with the animal that carves out
a territory and constructs a house (both are correlative, or even one and the same, in
what is called a habitat)'. A contrapuntal theory of Nature where nature and art become
indistinguishable. The bower bird is a `complete artist' (1996: 184), Scenopoeetes
dentirostris. Alliez (1993: 94) will seek to distinguish Deleuze and Guattari's approach
to ethology from Heidegger's phenomenology of behavior and `word-poverty' of the
animal by commencing with refrains, counterpoints, and expressive qualities; assem-
blages and becomings rather than behavior Ð `becoming-colors, becoming-sounds'.
A superior ethology _
27. Haar (1993: 160 fn. 8) notes (without any development of the relation) that this proper
peculiarity of self-production or autopoiesis `would come close to the notion of the
``uni®ed ®eld'' or ``absolute domain'' of individuality or presence, which according to
R. Ruyer (1950) would characterize life'.
This is a truly interesting conceptual relationship as Deleuze and Guattari draw
signi®cantly on Ruyer's work, especially in Deleuze and Guattari (1996) and Deleuze
(1993). For Deleuze and Guattari, following Ruyer, the organism has an `absolute
interiority' and the brain is `a primary true form' or `absolute domain' in `self-survey'.
For further insight into these terms see Bains (1997) which engages with the relation
between Deleuze, Guattari, and Ruyer.
28. In personal correspondence Deely makes the following observation: `Remember
that relatio secundum esse, unlike relatio secundum dici which has already the Latin
one-word synonym transcendentalis, never acquired a one-word counterpart among the
Latins. So my ``ontological'' relation is a neologism for the purpose. The term occurs
in Heidegger, but not the concept, i.e., not the notion of the relatio secundum esse
indierent to the otherwise contrasting orders of what is and is not independent of
cognition. I have since wondered if there might not have been a better choice; but what
might it be still eludes me'.
29. SeeCorrington(1994)forfurtherdiscussionofthedierencebetweenhumanandanimal
Umwelten undertaken within a generalized Peirce/Deely perspective. `Human meaning
horizons are not simply augmented versions of animal Umwelten, but have distinctive
features that radically alter the semiotic structures of the world' (1994: 188).
30. As Corrington (1994: 188±189) notes, traces of alterity/otherness within zoo È semiosis do
not always constitute or generate apprehension of their source, or involve conscious
awareness of otherness. This requires an awareness of relations. This is not in itself
a judgment but a distinction.
31. Emmeche provides the most comprehensive discussion of this question in his essay
`Does a Robot have an Umwelt?' (in this issue). The answer is no. `Thus only genuine
living beings (organisms and especially animals [as active subjects]) can be said to live
experientially an Umwelt'.
32. As Deleuze (1993: 104) notes following Ruyer (and Whitehead), `A great line of dier-
ence does not separate the organic from the inorganic, but crosses the one like the other
164 P. Bains
Brought to you by | Murdoch University Library
Authenticated | 134.115.4.99
Download Date | 1/25/13 6:23 AMbydistinguishing what isindividual fromwhatis acollectiveor massphenomenon, what
is an absolute form and what are massive, molar ®gures or structures'. Remember also
that Haar (note 27 above) sees a relation between Heidegger's `proper peculiarity' of the
organism and Ruyer's `absolute domains' which Deleuze and Guattari draw on
particularly in their ®nal work (1996).
33. This is one of the central claims of Zourabichvili (1996).
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